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Abstract
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are becoming increasingly prevalent for both Critical
Infrastructure and the Industry 4.0 initiative. Bad values within components of the software portion
of CPS, or the computer systems, have the potential to cause major damage if left unchecked, and
so detection and locating of where these occur is vital. We further define features of these computer
systems and create a use-based system topology. We then introduce a function to monitor system
integrity and the presence of bad values as well as an algorithm to locate them. We then show an
improved version, taking advantage of several system properties to increase efficiency. We
additionally delve into the use of digital twins for simulating potential bad values faster-than-realtime. Finally, we show evidence of our non-digital twin model’s effectiveness through simulation.

©2021 by Nathan Davis
All Rights Reserved

Acknowledgements
It is my honor to express my deepest and profound gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Brajendra
Panda. His consistent advice and dependable guidance have allowed me to reach further
academically than I believed, both in my undergraduate and graduate career. I would also like to
express my gratitude to Dr. John Gauch and Dr. Dale Thompson for being committee members
and sparking my passion for computer science and security, respectively. Finally, I would like to
thank all the friends I made here at the University of Arkansas for giving me support and a sense
of community, allowing me to always strive for the highest.

Table of Contents
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Related Works ....................................................................................................................... 2
2. Framework Definitions ....................................................................................................... 4
2.1 Components........................................................................................................................... 4
2.2 Component Categories .......................................................................................................... 4
2.3 Component Relationships ..................................................................................................... 5
2.4 System View ......................................................................................................................... 7
2.5 External Components ............................................................................................................ 8
2.6 Storing System Data .............................................................................................................. 9
2.7 Creating Modified System Structure ..................................................................................... 9
2.8 System Tasks ....................................................................................................................... 10
3. Detection & Location Techniques .................................................................................... 13
3.1 Detection Function .............................................................................................................. 13
3.2 Detection Function Weights ................................................................................................ 14
3.3 System Search ..................................................................................................................... 15
3.4 Search Algorithm Weights .................................................................................................. 18
3.5 Task-Based Detection ......................................................................................................... 19
4. Digital Twins .................................................................................................................... 22
4.1 Definition ............................................................................................................................ 22
4.1 Digital Twin Pre-Change Verification ................................................................................ 23
5. Simulation ......................................................................................................................... 25
6. Results ............................................................................................................................... 27
6.1 Data Set #1 .......................................................................................................................... 27
6.2 Data Set #2 .......................................................................................................................... 28

6.3 Data Set #3 .......................................................................................................................... 29
6.4 Data Set #4 .......................................................................................................................... 30
6.5 Data Set #5 .......................................................................................................................... 31
6.6 Data Set #6 .......................................................................................................................... 32
6.7 Data Set #7 .......................................................................................................................... 33
6.8 Data Set #8 .......................................................................................................................... 34
6.9 Data Set #9 .......................................................................................................................... 35
6.10 Data Set #10 ...................................................................................................................... 36
6.11 Result Analysis.................................................................................................................. 36
7. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 38
8. References ......................................................................................................................... 39

Introduction
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are often large and complex, with complicated
relationships within their numerous components. These systems include the incredibly vital power
grids and other Critical Infrastructure used throughout the country as well as in various
manufacturing processes with the advent of Industry 4.0. Within these “cyber” systems, or
computer systems, maintaining functionality is of utmost importance, as any downtime in a system
could result in numerous other issues ranging from user dissatisfaction to the collapse of services
relying on the system. Component failure within a computer system is an expected reality, and
while stopping the source of those faults completely may a viable approach, mitigating the effects
is often more achievable and is what we hope to accomplish in this work. Furthermore, while faults
or errors within components may be detectable through various techniques, there could also be
values that, while functional, are incorrect, which can lead to further inaccuracies and problems
through the system. These values are called bad values and can be caused either from faults within
a component or from external malicious attack.
We introduce a novel framework to detect bad values occurring in stateless components
within a generalized computer system and further to accurately identify which components are
producing bad values. We do this by constructing and updating a functional topology of a computer
system then performing regular checks to determine that system’s overall integrity. Then, if we
find the system integrity to be failing, searching through our generated topology to locate the faulty
components. We then expand on this methodology by leveraging certain properties of CPS to
improve the efficiency of our algorithm. Finally, we introduce the idea of Digital Twins into our
framework, which we use to implement a faster-than-real-time verification system into the CPS to
detect bad values.
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We continue this section with works related to this research. Section 2 presents our
framework and defines our methodology. Section 3 covers the approach for monitoring the system
integrity and locating bad values within. Section 4 shows the inclusion of Digital Twins into our
model and the benefits included with applying them to our framework. Section 5 presents our
simulation for our model and analysis of the results. Finally, we conclude in Section 6 with our
findings.

1.1 Related Works
Bad value detection in CPS builds from fault and bad data detection in sensor networks [35], which CPS are extensions of. Some examples of bad value detection in CPS focus on
mathematical models or system-wide approaches [26-30], though scalability is a challenge for
efficient detection. Bad data detection also has extensive research for power grids[6-12] where one
focus is on state estimation to predict potential faults. Security in CPS has been studied extensively,
such as the possibility of attacks from internal sources [38], such as workers or faults with
individual components, or external sources like malicious actors. Since CPS have applications in
Critical Infrastructure (CI), the effects of an attack could have far-reaching consequences [1, 2,
25] which must be addressed to mitigate potential damage as much as possible. Digital twins are
a part of the Industry 4.0 research area, having been created in 2003 [13] with extensive research
being performed on them, focusing on their ability to provide accurate and flexible real-time
simulation data [14-16, 18] about manufacturing and other industrial processes. There is research
into communication between digital twins, called experimental digital twins (EDT), by Schluse et
al. [20] which can be valuable for complex simulations and monitoring. Industry 4.0 is a term for
a new wave of manufacturing methodologies and ideas, continuing from the Internet of Things
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(IoT) and working to create “smart factories” [31]. CPS are seen as a natural fit for the increased
flexibility and decentralization desired for Industry 4.0 [21, 24, 36-37] and research has been
conducted combining CPS and Digital Twins together to provide more comprehensive analysis,
as well [17, 19, 33].

3

Framework Definitions
2.1 Components
The computer systems within a CPS are comprised of distinct components that perform a
specified function and pass that information on to other components. Components, for the purposes
of our work, are considered stateless black boxes with a qualified range of inputs and outputs.
Components will have weights assigned to them within our model, described in Section 4.
Components may also have weights or stored values as a part of the computer system, but we
choose not to store this information as it simplifies our model. Our model will still work if a
computer system includes stateful components, though we do not explore this any further in this
work. A component’s workflow is to accept inputs from other components or external information,
perform some function on those inputs, then provide outputs to other components. We expect both
the input and output to be qualified, or within the appropriate ranges specified for each component.
Thus, a bad value can be defined as a value that is outside of these qualified ranges. A component
has no limit on the number of inputs and outputs it can possess. We denote the set of all components
in a system as C, and a specific component as ci. Formally,
𝑐𝑖 ∈ 𝐶

2.2 Component Categories
To provided additional information, we categorize components in terms of importance to
the system’s core functionality. Components are either Critical, where their operation is directly
needed to maintain system functionality, or Non-Critical, where the component is not required for
system functionality. These categories are used within our model to focus our efforts, as a bad
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value produced by a Non-Critical component, while troublesome, will not cause any severe
damage like if it were a Critical component. The set of all Critical components is denoted by R and
the set of all Non-Critical components N. A Critical component is denoted by ri and a Non-Critical
component by ni. A component is either Critical or Non-Critical, but not both. Formally,
𝑟𝑖 ∈ 𝑅 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛𝑖 ∈ 𝑁
𝑅 ⊆ 𝑉 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑁 ⊂ 𝑉
𝑅 ∪ 𝑁 ≡ 𝑉 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅 ⋂ 𝑁 ≡ { }
By definition, at least one Critical component is required in a system, though Non-Critical
components are not necessary in a system. Since our goal is to maximize the uptime of the
computer system, and because Non-Critical components, by definition, do not affect the primary
function or uptime of the system, they do not need to be included in any of our detection or search
methods. They are still included in our model, and they can be checked for bad values just like
Critical components, but their function is not within the scope of our work here.

2.3 Component Relationships
Components are connected to one another within a system, accepting inputs from and
providing output to other components. These links are the core of a system, and it is here that an
issue in one component can affect other components, leading to reduced system integrity or worse,
total system failure. We denote the set of all links within a system as E. we define the relationship
between components as follows: If c1 outputs to c2, we say c2 is a receiver to c1, and likewise c1 is
a source of c2. We refrain from labeling this relationship as the more typical “child/parent” to allow
the case where two components both output and receive from one another. Figure 1 shows a simple
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Figure 2: Component Relationships

Figure 1: Acceptable/Unacceptable Relationships
Examples 1,2, and 3 are acceptable, while 4 is unacceptable

diagram of two components, where c1 is the source to c2 and c2 is the receiver to c1. Figure 1 also
shows a case where both c1 and c2 are source and receiver to each other, which is allowed.
Expanding the source/receiver relationship to include Critical and non-Critical components
leads to an additional limitation. While Critical components are free to be source and/or receiver
to either Critical or Non-Critical components, and Non-Critical components can be a receiver to
either type of component, they can only be a source to other Non-Critical components and are not
allowed to be a source to Critical components. Therefore, only Critical components can be sources
to other Critical components. This limitation reinforces the distinction between Critical and NonCritical components that the latter have no effect on the system’s critical functionality. Showing
this from another perspective, any component that outputs to a Critical component must itself be
a Critical component.
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2.4 System View
The set of all components and the links between those components make up a system,
denoted as S. For our purposes, a system is a directed graph, with the set of components, C, being
the vertices, and the edges between components being the dependencies explained in Section 2.3,
denoted E. Formally,
𝑆 = {𝐶, 𝐸}

Figure 3: Example System View
Figure 3 shows a simple system view, consisting of six components, four Critical and two
Non-Critical. Note that components may have multiple inputs and multiple outputs. Components
with solid outlines are Critical components, while the dotted outlines are Non-Critical components.
Also note that Critical components can output to Non-Critical components but not vice-versa.
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2.5 External Components
For a computer system within a CPS, it is inherently not isolated. That is, not only is
information flowing within the computer system, but there will also be information flowing into
and out of the computer system. We are primarily interested in information entering the system,
as that can alter and potentially disrupt the components within the computer system.

Figure 4: External Component
While we are not able to directly monitor these external sources, called “External”
component from here, the information they send is recorded. These External components represent
objects that are not local to the system, so they do not directly contribute to system integrity and
do not warrant additional monitoring in our model beyond the information they send to other, nonExternal, components. External components are allowed to be the source or receiver to any
component within the system. Figure 4 shows an example case where a system contains an
External component. Note that while the External component contributes to the system, they are
kept from influencing the functions defined further in.
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2.6 Storing System Data
We assume the computer system will have a log of all interactions within and between
components, which we believe is not a large assumption to make with modern computer systems.
These log files, which ideally mark what data was transferred, timestamps of that transfer, and the
components data travelled between, are integral to our model, since it will be used to create a
model of the system and to aid in the creation of the digital twins for each component.

2.7 Creating Modified System Structure
Since all data essential to our model is stored within the log files, we can reconstruct the
system’s structure. That is, we can create a model of the computer system’s component and
dependencies between them. There is, however, one large difference between the system’s
structure and our structure created from the logs, from now on referred to as the log-based system.
The actual computer system specifies components and dependencies between them, but not all
components within a system will be in use. Some might be simply for emergency cases or part of

Figure 5: Actual System vs. Log-Based System
Highlighted components and links exist in the actual system but are ununused and so are absent from the log-based system
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deprecated functions, but it is reasonable to assume that not all components or dependencies are
utilized in a system at once.
The log files store data of interactions that have happened in the past, while the actual
system defines interactions that are possible to occur in the future. Thus, the log-based system only
contains components and dependencies that have already occurred. Figure 5 is an example of a
log-based system and how it differs from the actual system. This simplifies our model, as we only
need to check for components that have been used, as an unused component is effectively the same
as not having a component there at all. If such a component would be used eventually, it would be
trivial to add this component into the log-based model.1 Formally, this log-based system, SL, is
defined as
𝑆𝐿 = {𝐶𝐿 , 𝐸𝐿 }
𝐶𝐿 ⊆ 𝐶 , 𝐸𝐿 ⊆ 𝐸
𝑡ℎ𝑢𝑠, 𝑆𝐿 ⊆ 𝑆
Where CL and EL are the components and corresponding dependencies present in SL.
Because CL and EL are subsets of C and E respectively, SL is therefore a subset of S.

2.8 System Tasks
One consideration we had to account for was components that are present in the actual
computer system but are unused, which we discuss in Section 2.7. Another consideration we must
make is once a system is large enough, it becomes increasingly likely that not all components will
be related to one another. That is, there will emerge multiple disjoint subsets of components. The
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presence of these disjoint subsets requires us to accommodate for components that have no
influence on each other.
We believe a reasonable classification of these disjoint subsets to be tasks within the
system, or system tasks. A task is a function performed by the system, requiring one or more
components. A component is likely to appear in more than one task within a system, and it this reoccurrence can be leveraged to better determine which component is producing a bad value, which
is explained more in Section 4.3. To this end, we not only track which components are in use by
the system, shown in Figure 3, but also which tasks a component is included in. An example of a
system containing multiple tasks can be seen in Figure 6, as seen from the view of the system.

Figure 6: System Containing Two Tasks

Figure 7: Task View of Figure 6
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Figure 7 shows the same system but separates the two tasks. Note that component r1 is present in
both tasks, since it may provide different values, or those values may be differently weighted, to
each task.
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Detection & Location Techniques
3.1 Detection Function
Our first technique to detect bad values within a computer system is a system-wide
Detection function, or DF. The DF provides a weighted average of each Critical component within
the system to produce an Integrity Value, or IV. The weights for each component are explained in
more detail in Section 3.2. The resulting IV represents the computer system’s overall integrity, and
if the IV is below a specified threshold, the signifies the system operating in potentially unsafe
conditions and should be checked for bad values. The IV is then normalized to a range between 0
– 100. The exact value of the IV threshold is to be determined on an individual basis, as some
systems may require complete integrity of its components while others are robust enough to
maintain safe conditions with a small loss of integrity.
The DF typically only includes Critical components as these are the components
determined to be vital to the computer system’s function and uptime, Non-Critical components
would have no bearing on the critical functions of a system. The DF can be performed on NonCritical components to ensure they are also performing under safe conditions, and this is shown
further in this work, however they are supplemental to the main purpose of the DF, the Critical
components. Below is the DF function, where C is the set of components, either Critical or,
optionally, Non-Critical, w is the multiplication of weights for a given component, v being a
component within C, and IV being the Integrity Value,

𝐷𝐹(𝐶) =

𝑤1 𝑣1 + 𝑤2 𝑣2 + 𝑤3 𝑣3 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝑖 𝑣𝑖
= 𝐼𝑉,
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐶

0 ≤ 𝐼𝑉 ≤ 100

The DF is run on a fixed time interval, that can be set by the local system administrator, so
that up-to-date information about the system is available. If the DF is performed against both
13

Critical and Non-Critical components, which again only Critical components are necessary, we
differentiate the IV of each type of component into RIV for Critical components and NIV for NonCritical components. The RIV and NIV can then be combined to produce a System Integrity Value,
SIV, which gives information about all components within a system.
𝑅𝐼𝑉 + 𝑁𝐼𝑉
= 𝑆𝐼𝑉
2
3.2 Detection Function Weights
The DF utilizes three weights, which are Sensitivity, S, Importance, I, and Probability of
producing a bad value, P, all of which are assigned individually to each component within a
system. We combine these weights into one variable, w, for each component, with wi assigned to
ci.
𝑤𝐷𝐹,𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖 × 𝐼𝑖 × 𝑃𝑖
Sensitivity is a measure of the correlation between a component’s input and output. That
is, the higher S is, the more a component’s output changes from the same change in input. For
example, if two components receive the same inputs, the component with higher Sensitivity will
have larger variation in its output compared to a component with a lower Sensitivity. We track this
value in a component because if a bad value is sent into a less sensitive component, the magnitude
of the effect on the component or system will be reduced. Likewise, if a component has a high
Sensitivity, even a small deviation resulting from a bad value could have major consequences.
Importance is a numerical representation of a component’s worth to the system and
determines which components are the most necessary to the system’s overall functioning. In effect,
it quantifies the relationship between Critical and Non-Critical components. Below a specified
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threshold, all components will be Non-Critical because they are less important to the system’s core
functionality. Similarly, all components above that threshold will be Critical. This numerical value
provides more information than the simple categorization of Critical versus Non-Critical, as some
Critical components may be more vital to a system than another and so require more careful
attention to bad values.
Finally, the last weight for the detection functions is Probability, P, which measures the
likelihood of a given component producing a bad value, either because of some innate quality of
the component or its likelihood to be targeted for malicious actors. These three weights combined
provide a more accurate measurement of each component’s integrity, and therefore the integrity
of the entire system, which is used when we search through the computer system for a specific
component at fault.

3.3 System Search
If the IV, or SIV if checking both Critical and Non-Critical components, is below the
specified threshold, then we search the system. First, all the relevant components are placed into a
priority queue. Because our focus is on Critical components, the rest of this section will assume
only Critical components are being searched, though this can be expanded to include Non-Critical
components, like the Detection Function, and is noted in the pseudocode of the algorithm. The
order of components within the priority queue is based on a set of three weights, I, Importance,
and P, Probability, the same weights from the Detection Function, and a new weight, T, Time since
last used. These weights will be explained more in the following section.
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Once the components are in place within the priority queue, components are checked for
bad values. While the specifics are left to the individual system, once a component is checked, it
is marked as such. This continues until a bad value is located. When that occurs, the component is
marked as containing a bad value for it to be removed, the component reset, or in some way
remedied determined by the individual system.
There exists the possibility, however, that the bad value did not originate from the
component that was just found. It is possible that the component’s source was modified
maliciously and propagated a bad value forward. To remedy this, once a bad value is located, a
depth-first search is performed on the sources of the located component to find any components
that may have passed the bad value. Theoretically, this depth-first search could continue until every
component related to a source is checked, which is vastly inefficient and unlikely to return a related
bad value. As such, we propose limiting the search to a certain depth, that can be set according to
a system’s needs.
While a component could receive a bad value from its source, the reverse is also true and
must be checked. In addition to searching the sources of the located component, that component’s
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receivers need to be checked to ensure the bad value has not spread further through the system.
This should also be limited to a certain depth, as with the sources.

Figure 9: Priority Queue

Figure 8: System w/ Search
Algorithm Weights
Figure 8 begins an example of performing a search through a computer system. Figure 8
shows a simple system structure, with the relevant weights added to each component. The weights
in this example are chosen arbitrarily, though the weights in practice will be calculated from
observable or assigned parameters. This example only searches through Critical components, for
simplicity, though an actual search could search through Non-Critical components as well, which
is why the weights are added to the Non-Critical components even though they are not used. The
Critical components are subsequently sorted by their weights and then inserted into a priority
queue, as shown in Figure 9. The first component in the priority queue, r1, is taken from the priority
queue and checked for bad values as shown in Figure 10, though none are found. The search
continues with the next component in the priority queue, r3, which does return a bad value, shown
in Figure 11. Because a bad value was discovered in r3, Figure 12 shows the sources and receivers
of r3 being searched. This is typically bounded to a certain depth, but because r1, an indirect source
of r3, has already been checked and cleared for bad values, the only remaining relatives to check
17

are r4 and r2, though no bad values are found in either. This leads to Figure 13 showing that all the
relevant components have been searched with only r3 containing a bad value.

Figure 10: 1st Search Step
No bad values found

Figure 11: 2nd Search Step
Bad value found

Figure 12: 3rd Search Step
No bad values found among
relatives

Figure 13: Final Search State
1 bad value discovered total

3.4 Search Algorithm Weights
These weights are used to determine which components should be searched first, achieved
by placing those components sooner in the priority queue. We use three weights for this purpose,
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Importance, I, and Probability of bad value, P, the same weights as used for the Detection Function
earlier, and another weight, T, Time since component was last used. These weights are derived
similarly to the weights used in the Detection Function, from analysis of a particular computer
system, with the value of I and P being the same for the search as they are for the Detection
Function. If a component has not been used since T, then any bad value produced by that
component is from that time, and if T is large, that corresponds to a lower likelihood that this
component is currently affecting system integrity negatively. That is, if T is large, then it’s
corresponding component will be further down in the priority queue. The weights are combined to
produce a single weight, for simplicity.

𝑤𝑆𝐴,𝑖 = 𝐼𝑖 × 𝑃𝑖 ×

1
𝑇

3.5 Task-Based Detection
The detection function presented in Section 3.1 provides a value representing the systemwide integrity of Critical components, or optionally Non-Critical components. This information
allows us to determine if bad values are present, or a large enough problem to warrant locating
components. However, it is only able to determine if the integrity of the system is failing, but
nothing else, such as which components are at fault, pushing that to a system-wide search which
is already not time efficient in large enough systems. Ideally, there would be some way to narrow
the potential search space from the entire system. Furthermore, it is unable to account for systems
containing multiple disjoint subsets of components as it calculates the value of all Critical/NonCritical components together, assuming all components influence every other component. This
would lead to a case where a bad value could be present in a single subset of components, bringing
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down the IV, or SIV, though because the DF provides no information on which subset contains
the bad values, time is wasted searching components that should not be considered at all.
To solve this issue, we leverage the grouping of components by task, as described in
Section 2.8. As stated previously, it is reasonable to assume that a component will be included in
multiple tasks within a system and, further, will have different weights for each task. By modifying
the detection function from Section 3.1 to calculate an IV for all components within a task rather
than the entire system, we get multiple benefits. Firstly, the size of a task will necessarily be smaller
than the size of the entire system, already providing more information for where the affected
component is located, allowing us to narrow our search space. This is because tasks are subsets of
a computer system, meaning at worse, a computer system will contain a task that is equal in size
or, from another perspective, the computer system consists of a single task. This is highly unlikely,
especially as a system grows and the time difference becomes more noticeable, and so that case
would in fact gain very little from this updated implementation and would perform similarly using
the standard DF. Secondly, if a component is present in multiple tasks, which is more likely for
larger system, the outputs, or IVs, of multiple DF’s can be cross-referenced to look for common
components between the tasks. This is the best case scenario, as it allows us to further pinpoint in
which component a bad value is occurring. Both the smaller size of tasks and potential for crossreferencing reduce the time spent searching the system for bad values and make calculating IVs
by task much more effective and valuable searching through an entire system.
The Task-based Detection Function is presented below:

𝑇𝐷𝐹(𝐶) =

𝑤1 𝑝1 𝑣1 + 𝑤2 𝑝2 𝑣2 + 𝑤3 𝑝3 𝑣3 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝑖 𝑝𝑖 𝑣𝑖
= 𝐼𝑉,
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐶

𝑝 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑝 = 0
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There is major difference between this new function and the original detection function, p,
which is specific to each component. This new value represents if a given component is present
within the task the TDF is currently performing on. That is, if a component is present within a
given task, p is 1. Otherwise, p is 0. This generalizes the function, only requiring us to keep track
of which components are in which task, something that is trivial to do given our model, instead of
needing to modify the function for each task.
The search algorithm changes very little to accommodate task-based detection. Instead of
the entire system being searched at a time, only tasks that indicate bad values will be searched.
The result will look very similar to the original search example from the previous section, but
whereas the previous example represented an entire system structure, in this modified version, that
would be a single task within a system. As many tasks are separate from one another, it can be
seen as many smaller searches occurring throughout the system simultaneously, though the result
remains the same.

21

Digital Twins
4.1 Definition
All the methods presented in Section 3 share one common weakness; they only detect if a
bad value is already present within the system. This means in the time between a component
producing a bad value and an integrity check is performed, damage could already be spreading
throughout the system and potentially cause catastrophic damage before it is ever noticed. This is
not to say the previous methods are not valuable, as they still provide valuable information in
detecting bad values, however with our main goal to maximize the uptime in a computer system,
it is better to prevent bad values from ever occurring in the first place, eliminating the possibility
of a bad value cascading through the system.

Figure 14: System and Respective Digital Twins
Each component has a digital twin, which essentially recreates the structure
To prevent such an occurrence from happening within a component, we would need some
way to test the values going into a component first. We can accomplish this with digital twins. A
digital twin is a simulation of an actual object synchronized to match any changes occurring to the
original. That is, if a component c has a digital twin, denoted dc, and the same change was applied
22

to both c and dc, both would remain identical after the change, such is the synchronicity between
c and dc. Figure 14 gives a basic view of implementing digital twins in a system, where the right
layout is the actual system and the left being the digital twins, the “digital” system. Digital twins
are often used to test changes to systems before they implemented in a physical system, and some
components within a computer system are physical, though it is possible that some components
only exist within the system, that is they virtual. This does not create a problem for using digital
twins, as a digital twin can still simulate a virtual component and its function. If a component had
a digital twin, each input could be applied to the digital twin first to see if the actual component
would remain within the qualified ranges. With this, we can prevent a bad value from passing into
the component, keeping the system from accepting bad input and potentially cause unsafe
operating conditions.

4.1 Digital Twin Pre-Change Verification
We implement this idea of applying values to a digital twin before the actual component
through what we call digital twin pre-change verification. With digital twin pre-change
verification, anytime a component receives input, that input will be simulated in a digital twin for
that component. If the resulting output in the digital twin is within the qualified range, the input
can be passed to the component. However, if the input results in a value outside of the qualified
range, the input can be rejected, or an alert be raised. Normal system operation should not create
bad values, so if a digital twin does detect one, the malicious value must come from one or more
of the input components. It is possible that an acceptable value in one component, when sent to
another component as input, can result in a bad value in the receiving component. However, it is
possible that the component at fault is indirectly related to the component at fault, potentially being

23

separated by one or two intermediary nodes. Because of this, digital twins can prevent bad values
from occurring, though they are not enough on their own to determine the source of the bad value,
either an accidental or potentially malicious modification to a component that only produces a bad
value after one or more components. Digital twins can, however, narrow down the list of possible
components to check, as it must be a component related to the input components.
Digital twin pre-change verification provides us the most effective solution within our
model, allowing us to detect potential bad values before they can disrupt the computer system.
Simply using the simple detection function and search algorithm does not accommodate for
computer systems with components that are unrelated to one another, as is the case with tasks
allowing for disjoint subsets of components within a system. In addition, the search algorithm has
a very large search space, essentially the entire computer system, which is infeasible for any
complex computer system, and may waste time searching components unrelated to the bad value,
again because it does not include the concept of system tasks and instead assumes that all
components are related. Task-based detection allows us to narrow the search space down to a
single task at worst or, if multiple tasks are flagged and share common components, a single
component at best. This certainly helps us detect bad value within components, however our goal
is to keep the system operational and maximize system uptime. If we simply detect a bad value
that is already present within the system, there is a window between the bad value appearing in the
system and the system check being performed when major damage could occur to the computer
system. Utilizing digital twins allow us to detect bad values before there is a chance for damage to
occur in a system while also keeping a narrow search space for locating the bad value.
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Simulation
To test that our model is beneficial, we simulate a computer system and our model
searching for bad values, specifically to show differences between our initial detection function
and our task-based detection function. We have not simulated digital twins in a system, though it
is reasonable to see the benefits of implementing digital twins over the two detection function
models, preventing bad values instead of searching for them after-the-fact.
Our simulation builds a log-based computer system task-wise from the bottom-up, creating
relationships between components, randomly assigning sources and receivers. In our simulation,
a task contains a random number of components within the system and components have different
relationships for each task. Each component within the simulation has randomly assigned weights
for the detection functions and searches, as well. Within our simulation, we can control the number
of components within the system, the maximum number of sources and receivers a single
component can have, the threshold for Critical components, or what value of I, Importance, above
which a component is considered Critical. We also control the percentage of components active
within the system, considering our earlier assertion that not all components within a system are
used. Finally, we control the number of tasks within the system, again with random components
in each task. In real systems, some components would have more connections and be present in
more tasks than other components. While this differs from our simulation, it is still effective, and
assigning components randomly prevents bias from entering our data through task selection.
Once the system is created, a bad value is placed in a single random component within,
and a search of the entire system is performed. This is analogous to the initial detection function
implementation, which requires the entire system to be searched. The number of components
searched is then recorded to be shown in our results. After this search and while maintaining the
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same system structure, we perform detection functions for a single task within the system. Since
these tasks are randomly created, the bad value may or may not appear within a task. Once it is, a
search is performed against that task, again tracking the number of components searched until the
bad value is located. A key benefit of the task-based detection was looking for common
components between tasks that signaled a bad value, and so in our simulation, as tasks are added
to the system if a new task contains a bad value, only components shared between the tasks are
searched. This continues until the maximum number of tasks is reached or if the only component
searched is the one containing the bad value, with the total number of components searched
recorded for each number of tasks within the system. These tests were performed with varying
numbers of components in the system and maximum numbers of sources and receivers. To ensure
that the number of components set was accurate, all components were considered Critical and were
active within the system. Our results follow in the next section.
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Results
The results of our simulation testing are displayed by the number of components checked
against the number of tasks present in the system. For example, the “0” mark represents checking
the entire system, as if there are no tasks in a system it must all be checked. In the “5” mark, that
represents the system having five tasks in total, but not necessarily five tasks containing the bad
value. For each set of parameters tested, a total of ten runs were performed, the average of those
ten runs are plotted on the line, while the bars above each point show the maximum and minimum
values across the ten runs. The two parameters tested were the number of components within a
system and the maximum number of sources and receivers to a component. The first parameter’s
purpose is to determine if our model holds for larger systems, and how the two methods compare.
The second parameter is included to discover any possible correlation between the efficiency of
the search and the number of connections between components.
6.1 Data Set #1
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The first data set was performed on systems comprised of 100 components limited to five
sources and five receivers at maximum. When searching through the entire system, it took on
average just under 60 components to find the bad value though in one case it had to search every
component, an unlikely but possible case. As tasks were added to the system, the search space
narrows until around 90 total tasks when the bad value is the only component checked.
6.2 Data Set #2
100 Components, 2 Max Sources, 2 Max Receivers
# of Components Checked
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The second test contained a similar 100 components though they were limited to only two
sources or receivers at maximum. Like the first set, the full system search was highly variable,
though the search tended to a single component again. This was reached much faster, however, at
around 70 total tasks.
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6.3 Data Set #3
250 Components, 5 Max Sources, 5 Max Receivers
# of Components Checked
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This test set increased the components in the system to 250. The maximum number of tasks
was also increased to 250 in case the number of tasks needed to reach one component also
increased. This showed to be true, as it took until almost 150 total tasks to reach a single
component, though from 50 total task and on had on average 10 component searched, a significant
increase from the full system search and smaller numbers of total tasks.

29

6.4 Data Set #4
250 Components, 2 Max Sources, 2 Max Receivers
# of Components Checked
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The fourth test was performed with 250 components in the system and 2 sources and
receivers per component at maximum. The numbers of components checked again reaches one,
though it is reached slightly quicker than the previous test at just over 100 total tasks. Also, slightly
sooner than the last test, 40 total tasks marked the point where the average number of components
reached below 10.
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6.5 Data Set #5
500 Components, 5 Max Sources, 5 Max Receivers
# of Components Checked
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Increasing the system to 500 components does not result in much change from the previous
sets. With the full system search and searches with few total tasks, the number of components
checked varies wildly, but still exhibits a clear trend to checking only the correct component.
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6.6 Data Set #6

# of Component s Checked
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With 500 components and two sources and two receivers at maximum, the average reaches
below two components searched on average at 70 total tasks, and finally reaching only a single
component searched at around 150 total tasks. Due to the randomness with our weights and tasks,
this set averages lower than expected in the first few marks.
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6.7 Data Set #7

# of Components Checked
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Increasing the number of components to 1,000 leads to an expected increase in the number
of tasks needed to reach a single component searched on average, taking until almost 200 total
tasks. Likewise, it takes until 90 total tasks to reach under 10 components searched on average.
Overall, the decrease of components checked as the number of tasks increase becomes more
noticeable.
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6.8 Data Set #8
1000 Components, 2 Max Sources, 2 Max Receivers
# of Components Checked
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Lowering the maximum number of connections per component greatly reduces the number
of components searched, reaching below 10 components searched on average at just 60 total tasks.
Note that the maximum for 5 total tasks is lower than for 10 and 20 tasks. This is a result of the
random nature of task selection in our simulation, where for certain runs the bad value was not
found within the first five tasks. With a larger system and fewer connections between components,
this is to be expected.
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6.9 Data Set #9

# of Components Checked
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With 2,000 components, the searches take longer to reach a minimum, only reaching below
10 components around 100 total tasks and reaching a single component at over 150 tasks. Relative
to the size of the system, this is quite small and a large improvement over the full system search.
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6.10 Data Set #10

# of Components Checked
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With the reduced number of component connections, the average reaches below 10
components at 80 total tasks and reaches one at just over 100 total tasks, which is even faster than
with 5 maximum sources and receivers. Once again, with 5 and 10 total tasks, the maximum is
lower than for 20 and 25 total tasks for the same reason as in the sixth dataset, that because of the
large number of components and small number of connections between them, the bad value was
not present in the first 10 tasks for the largest run.
6.11 Result Analysis
Overall, the data shows that an increase in the total number of tasks results in a reduction
in the number of components that must be checked to locate a bad value, even as the size of the
system grows. This fully supports our assertion that while the original detection function can
successfully locate a bad value, utilizing the shared components between tasks results in a smaller
search space and thus requires fewer components to be checked. Our results also reveal a
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correlation that we did not expect from our model, that the fewer number of connections between
components influence the number of components searched. For the datasets with 2 maximum
sources and receivers per component, they reached lower numbers of components searched faster
than the 5 maximum datasets in all our tests. This makes sense, as with potentially fewer
components in a task, there are less components that are present in multiple tasks. This means the
number of components shared between tasks that detected a bad value will naturally be smaller, as
well.
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Conclusion
This paper explores modeling the structure of computer systems in Cyber-Physical systems
to detect and locate bad values to maintain computer system integrity and functionality. We present
a new scalable framework that is capable of modeling various kinds of computer systems. We can
then monitor a system’s integrity through its components, split between core functionality in
Critical components and non-essential Non-Critical components, and apply this knowledge to
locating the bad values. We also explore optimizations of this framework, taking advantage of the
grouping of components into tasks to improve the efficiency of our approach. We finally discuss
the inclusion of Digital Twins and a pre-change verification technique to pro-actively detect bad
values before they propagate through a system, which further improves the effectiveness of our
approach.
Future work in this area includes performing additional simulations for the task-based
detection function, case study testing on the present framework and testing of the digital twin prechange verification methodology. Additional work could also be done in expanding the definitions
of our system model, allowing for the work to apply to more complex situations where CPS are
implemented.
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